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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we examine the importance of institutional arrangements and factors related to the 
economic structure to explain inflation outcomes in Latin America. We perform a dynamic 
panel data analysis with an ample set of variables that allowed us to consider the temporal 
dimension of the data, and to control for endogeneity. Results lead us to believe that institutional 
arrangements – other than central bank independence –  have played an important role in terms 
of inflation outcomes in Latin America.  Variables that may affect inflation via time consistency 
problems seem somewhat more relevant than those suggested by optimal tax considerations. In 
particular, the negative correlation between political constraints to changes in public policies 
and inflation in Latin America is quite suggestive. We find that less flexible exchange rate 
regimes, advances in structural policies, and better government institutions have contributed to 
the reduction in inflation rates in the region. Faster growing countries exhibited lower inflation 
rates. Openness to trade seems to be positively correlated with inflation, suggesting that more 
open economies are more exposed to external shocks, allowing countries to benefit in terms of 
importing lower international inflation rates in recent years. Other variables did not prove to be 
significant.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
After a decade of double digit rates and hyper-inflation episodes, inflation experienced a 
remarkable decline in Latin America throughout the nineties. A widely accepted claim is 
that different fiscal and monetary regimes across countries are the culprits of cross-country 
variations of inflation dynamics. Yet it seems natural to inquire what factors actually 
determine the choice of such policies. In this paper we address that question through an 
empirical analysis encompassing an ample set of structural and institutional variables that 
may be affecting the policy-making process that underlies inflation outcomes in Latin 
America.  
 
How can institutional arrangements and the structure of the economy affect inflation? In 
mainstream literature we find two mechanisms to canalize their effects. On the one hand, 
factors such as market imperfections, lack of central bank independence, political 
instability, poor institutions, and redistributional pressures, among others, may elicit the 
dynamic inconsistency problem and create an inflation bias (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, 
and Barro and Gordon, 1983) 4. On the other hand, in the presence of tax evasion or high 
costs to tax certain sectors, fiscal authorities could resort to seignorage more extensively, as 
a form of optimal taxation (Kimbrough, 1986). Thus, by means of dynamic inconsistency 
or optimal taxation, factors related to the economic structure and institutions may cause the 
monetary authority to admit larger inflation rates.  
 
The role of central bank independence has captured a lot of attention in the literature 
concerned with the link between dynamic inconsistency, institutional arrangements and 
inflation. Cukierman (1992) developed a widely used quantitative measure of central bank 
independence to empirically assess its effects on inflation. Campillo and Mirón (1997), 
                                                 
4 The argument here is as follows. Suppose policy makers wanted to commit to a certain inflation path (e.g., 
an optimal path). If they sequentially chose inflation rates, they will have incentives to deviate from that path 
each period in order to attain higher growth. Instead, if for all periods policy is conducted according to a state-
contingent rule, deviations from the path are less likely to take place. Hence, inflation rates are higher under 
discretionary policy than under rules. We can think of the variables we consider in this paper affect inflation 
by enhancing the incentives for policy makers to deviate from the optimal path. 
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Fuhrer (1997), Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002), Jácome and Vázquez (2005), 
among others, also contributed to this line of research. Although there are theoretical 
grounds to expect that an independent central bank would less easily compromise its 
inflation goal due to undue political pressure, the empirical evidence supporting that 
different degrees of central bank independence lead to different inflation outcomes is not 
robust. This is especially true for developing economies when other economic and 
institutional determinants are controlled for, as is the case with structural reforms in Latin 
America (see Jácome and Vázquez, 2005).  
 
Factors underlying the structure of the economy that may affect dynamic inconsistency and 
inflation bias have received less attention though. For instance, market imperfections 
translate into lower than social optimum levels of output and the larger the distortion, the 
more incentives the monetary authority has to generate monetary surprises in an effort to 
push output closer to efficiency levels, at the cost of aggravating the inflation bias. In this 
line of thought, Lane (1997) studies the effect of trade openness on inflation in the presence 
of monopolistic competition and price rigidities in the non-traded sector. As the economy is 
more open to trade, the importance of the distortion in the non-traded sector decreases, and 
there are fewer incentives for the monetary authority to deviate from the optimal inflation 
rate.  For a cross-section of countries, Lane finds that trade openness is associated with 
smaller inflation rates, consistent with results in Romer (1993).  
 
In a similar vein, Neiss (2001) studies the impact on inflation of the degree of monopolistic 
competition in the economy, approximated by the size of the markup. She finds that higher 
markups are associated with larger inflation rates in OECD countries.  A skewed income 
distribution may also affect the inflation bias. Based on previous cross-country evidence 
suggesting that inflation and income inequality are positively correlated, Albanesi (2000) 
models this correlation as the result of a distributional conflict underlying the determination 
of fiscal policy through a bargaining game where the more inequality, the higher the 
inflation rate.  
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Inflation aversion by certain sectors of the economy may also affect price stability. Posen 
(1995) argues that financial sector opposition to inflation actually puts pressure on the 
central bank to consistently pursue counterinflationary policies. Thus, the presence of large 
and developed financial sector may result in lower inflation rates. 
  
Regarding optimal tax considerations, Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) show that the 
optimal inflation tax is positive if structural frictions, such as the informal sector, are 
present. Since the government is not capable of observing or taxing labor income, 
consumption or financial transactions in the underground economy, the optimal inflation 
tax will be positive to compensate for the loss in the formal tax base. Koreshkova (2003) 
reports a positive correlation between average inflation rates and the size of the informal 
sector, and also models this relationship as an optimal taxation problem in the presence of 
distortions in the labor and production markets.  
 
Other studies have focused on the impact of political variables on inflation. The idea 
developed in this literature is that political instability may lead to frequent cabinet changes, 
shortening the horizon of policy makers. This in turn may aggravate the dynamic 
inconsistency problem, creating incentives for policy makers to concentrate more on short-
term objectives which may imply frequent macroeconomic policy changes that finally 
translate into higher and more unstable inflation rates. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) results 
suggest that political instability and polarization can explain differences in inflation across 
countries, while the optimal taxation view of inflation does not seem be that important in 
developing nations.  Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) find that political instability 
yields higher seignorage and inflation rates for a larger sample of countries. More recently, 
Aisen and Veiga (2003) find that political instability is not only associated to higher 
inflation rates but also to higher volatility.  
 
But not only political instability affects policy outcomes. Polity variables and institutions 
behind the policy-making process may well have an impact on the resulting quality of 
public policies and policy outcomes (see Spiller et al., 2003). For instance, frequent cabinet 
changes translate into unstable public policies as long as the institutional framework of 
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checks and balances allows it. Henizs (2002) builds an index to capture the probability of 
change in public policies given the effective veto power of political agents in the system, 
other than the executive, and the alignment and fragmentation of agents with veto power. 
The index can be regarded as a measure of the limits to discretionality in public policies. 
Henisz finds that the fewer the political constraints to discretionality, the more unstable 
public policies become. The link between the probability of change in public policies 
approximated by this index and inflation has not been empirically examined yet, and we 
may expect that fewer political limits to discretionality to entail higher inflation rates. 
 
Our paper focuses in Latin America and its contribution of is to include a wider set of 
determinants of inflation amongst factors underlying the structure of the economy and 
institutions –income distribution, informality, trade openness, market imperfections, output 
composition, political limits to discretionality, central bank independence, competition 
regulation, structural reforms and government institutions– some of which have not been 
considered before or jointly tested for the region5. Previous studies mostly employed 
averages of a cross section of countries6, whereas we consider the temporal dimension of 
the data working with dynamic panel techniques (Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Arellano 
and Bover, 1995) to account for inflation inertia and control for the possible endogeneity of 
many of the regressors.  
 
Our results suggest that less flexible exchange rate regimes contributed to inflation 
reduction since the late eighties and over the nineties. More political limits to 
discretionality, advances in market oriented structural reforms, and better government 
institutions had a significant negative correlation with inflation rates in Latin America, 
particularly in the nineties. Openness to trade seems to be positively correlated with 
inflation, suggesting that more open economies are more exposed to external shocks, rather 
than the negative effect correlation expected from optimal tax considerations. The results 
are robust to different specifications of the instruments, although the coefficients on 
                                                 
5 Even if we rationalize the effects of this variables on inflation within the framework of dynamic 
inconsistency and optimal taxation, there may be alternative explanations. Hence, our results can be 
interpreted independently of those arguments.   
6 More recently, Aisen and Veiga (2000) and Jácome and Vázquez (2005) consider the temporal dimension of 
the data, but neither control for some of the variables we include in our approach. 
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government institutions and limits to discretionality measures are less robust, possibly due 
to the high correlation between them.  The paper is structured as follows: the next section 
explains the variables use in the analysis, the third section presents the econometric results 
and the last section contains some final considerations.  
 
 
2. The data  
 
The dataset contains annual information of 18 Latin American countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. The period spans from 1980 to 2004, although not all variables are available for 
the entire period.  
 
It is worth mentioning that our focus here is to investigate the effect of institutional 
arrangements and structural variables on inflation, behind fiscal and monetary policy.  We 
thus decided to exclude these variables from our analysis7.  
 
Tables 1 through 7 present country averages per decade and display countries ranked 
according to their performance in each case. Figures 1 through 7 contain yearly averages 
over countries for each variable, to account for the regional dynamics throughout the 
sample period.. The sources of the data are: IMF’s International Financial Statistics (CPI, 
GDP, imports, exports,), Cepal’s Statistical Yearbook National Accounts data (GDP, GDP 
by economic sectors, compensation of employees and income distribution by quintiles), 
International Labor Organization (informal employment), Rienhart and Roggoff (2002) (de 
facto exchange rate regime classification), Jácome and Vázquez (2005) (central bank 
independence index), Government Institutions (International Country Risk Guide), World 
Bank’s Development Indicators (market capitalization of listed companies), Lora (2001) 
                                                 
7 Aisen and Veiga (2000) follow a similar approach. In fact, it appears that the empirical literature fails to find 
a significant relationship between fiscal deficits (measured as a percentage of GDP) and inflation, and Jácome 
and Vázquez (2005) find this to be true as well for Latin America. For a recent work that examines the role of 
fiscal deficits on inflation and finds a significant relationship between them, see Catao and Terrones (2005).  
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(index of structural reforms), Henizs (2002) (Political limits to discretionality in public 
policies), countries’ competition laws (competition regulation index), Osiris (industry 
concentration) and Bankscope (bank concentration).  
 
Inflation. As shown in Figure 1, the average inflation rate in Latin America experienced a 
dramatic drop in the nineties, compared to the high rates exhibited in the eighties. Table 1 
displays average inflation rates over the eighties and nineties for each country and ranks 
their performance. It highlights that most countries –except for Peru, Ecuador and 
Venezuela– cut back inflation by half, and that there is a great dispersion in the data, not 
only over time, but across countries. For our econometric analysis we measure inflation by 
the ratio ππ +1/ , where π  is the percentage variation of annual CPI. This rescaling of 
inflation somewhat diminishes potential problems of heterocedasticity as it assigns less 
weight to high inflation episodes. As Jácome and Vázquez (2005), we exclude 
hyperinflation episodes8.  
 
Variables related to the Structure of the Economy  
 
Growth. Latin America exhibited a poor performance in terms of economic growth over the 
last decades. As seen in Table 2 and Figure 2, most countries exhibited negative per capita 
GDP growth rates during the eighties, while in the nineties most countries improved their 
economic growth performance. Several authors have found a negative correlation between 
inflation and growth; particularly high inflation episodes causing growth to drop sharply 
(see Bruno and Easterly, 1998, and Khan and Senhadji, 2001). We then expect growth to 
have a negative sign, and treat it as an endogenous variable.   
 
Openness to trade. Romer (1993) and Lane (1995) associate greater openness to lower 
inflation, since openness reduces economic distortions leading to rely on inflation tax. On 
the other hand, more open economies are exposed to external shocks to a larger extent, 
                                                 
8 We omitted observations were annual inflation rate was above 200%. This accounted for a total of 30 
observations: 20 between 1980 and 1989, and 10 between 1990 and 2002. Using a higher threshold as 1000% 
does not alter the econometric results much, particularly in the nineties. The countries that experienced such 
inflation episodes were: Argentina (1983-1985and 1988-1990) Brazil (1985, 1987-1994), Nicaragua (1985-
1991) and Peru (1988-1991).  
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implying a positive correlation between these variables. Therefore, the effect of openness 
on inflation depends on which effect is stronger (Aisen and Veiga, 2000). The degree of 
openness in the region has moderately increased since 1980, but there is a great dispersion 
across countries. Central American countries tend to be very open, whereas in Brazil and 
Argentina trade barely represents about 20% of GDP. 
 
Income distribution. A skewed income distribution can exert redistributional pressures that 
can cause dynamic inconsistency problems, or as in Albanesi (2000) bring about public 
finance conflicts so that higher inflation rates are accepted. Thus, we should expect higher 
inflation rates the more skewed the income distribution. Then again, inflation also has a 
negative impact on income distribution. Therefore, we treat this variable as endogenous. 
We measured income distribution by the ratio of Q5/Q1, which reports how large the 
income of the richest quintile compares to that of the poorest quintile9.  It is widely known 
that Latin America is a very unequal region. The average income distribution in the region 
has not changed much over the period, yet there are variations across countries10.   
 
Industrial composition. The relative importance of certain economic sectors to GDP has 
been related to inflation via optimal tax considerations. The presence of economic sectors 
which are costly to tax may induce the fiscal authorities to rely more heavily on seignorage 
to finance their budget. Therefore, a larger share of the agricultural sector to GDP should be 
positively correlated with inflation. (Cuckierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992) By the 
same token, the correlation between inflation with easier to tax sectors (manufacture, 
mining and service11) should be negative.  In addition to these considerations, larger 
industrial and service sectors may also be an indication of development and in consequence 
of a more effective tax system, further reducing the need for seignorage. The service sector 
is predominant in Latin America, yet its participation varies across countries. The 
                                                 
9 We resorted to this measure since we could not find a consistent data base for the Gini coefficient for Latin 
American countries during our sample period. The Gini coefficient provides more information than Q5/Q1, 
but in terms of cross-country variations and dynamics, they should provide similar information. Thus, this 
measure is perfectly suitable for our purposes in this paper. 
10 According to this measure, some countries have improved their income distribution, (Uruguay, Panamá, 
Nicaragua), others have worsened it (Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, Costa Rica), and others remained 
virtually the same (Chile, Brazil, Mexico). 
11 Service sector includes: utilities; construction; wholesale and retail trading; transportation, storage and 
communications; and community, social, personal and government services. 
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importance of the manufacture, mining or agricultural sectors is also heterogeneous across 
the sample.  
 
Informal employment. Koreshkova (2003) finds a positive correlation between the size of 
the underground economy and inflation. She rationalizes this result as the outcome of an 
optimal taxation problem, where seignorage is an optimal tax in the presence of a tax 
evading sector, i.e., the informal sector. As a proxy of the size of the underground 
economy, we use the fraction of informal employment to total employment, using OIT 
information. There are methods to measure the size of the informal economy12, but those 
are beyond the scope of this paper. Informal employment should move in tandem with the 
size of the underground economy and that suffices for the purpose of our empirical 
analysis. The average informal employment has increased in the region over the nineties, 
but the size of the sector varies a lot across countries, ranging from Uruguay with 34% of 
informal employment, to Panama with 55%. 
 
Monopolistic competition. The larger the degree of monopolistic competition, the more full 
employment output deviates from its social optimum. This can exacerbate the inflation bias 
as the monetary authority could increase its efforts to raise output via monetary surprises 
(Neiss, 2001). Therefore, the degree of monopolistic competition should be positively 
correlated with inflation. We use two cross country comparable economy-wide measures to 
approximate the degree of monopolistic competition: a measure of the markup of price over 
marginal cost and an index of industrial concentration. We follow the approach in Neiss 
(2001) to compute the markup, which is based on Gali (1995)13. With the exception of 
Ecuador, which is an outlier in the sample, the there does not seem to be large variations 
across countries.  We treat the markup as an endogenous variable, since it could be argued 
                                                 
12 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for the DYMIMIC approach to measure the size of the underground 
economy. 
13 Departing from the firm’s profit-maximization condition, the markup is derived as the ratio of the elasticity 
of output with respect to labor over the share of labor of total income. Assuming that the elasticity of output 
with respect to labor is equal across countries (same technology), the markup is then the inverse of the ratio of 
compensation of employees to GDP. 
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that the markup is affected by the average rate of inflation as well14. Following Dutz and 
Hayri (1999) we proxy de degree of overall industrial concentration with alternative 
measures of concentration (C5, C10 and the Hirshman-Herfindahl index) based on 
information of the publicly listed firms for each country15.  We constructed similar 
measures to assess the concentration in the banking sector. The regional average for the 
markup is around 3%, and it has not varied much throughout the period.  
   
Financial development. Posen (1995) argues that the presence of a large and developed 
financial sector averse to inflation sets pressures on the central bank to commit to low 
inflation rates. Thus, we should expect a negative correlation between financial 
development and inflation. Our indicator for financial development is the market 
capitalization of publicly listed companies as a percentage of GDP, which gives an idea of 
the importance of the stock market16. The market capitalization has increased in most 
countries, particularly over the nineties, but the size of the stock market relative to GDP 
varies substantially across countries, ranging from Chile with an average ratio of 85 to 
Dominican Republic with less than 1. 
 
Idebtedness. For optimal tax considerations, countries with high ratios of debt total debt to 
GDP should be expected to use more heavily inflation tax in the future. We observe that 
indebtedness in the region has a lot of dispersion, with outliers as Nicaragua, where debt is 
3.9 times larger than GDP. Over the nineties, the regional average shows a decline in the 
degree of indebtedness, but that is not the case for all countries17. After 2000, countries 
seem to have started their debt again.  
 
                                                 
14 In high inflation economies, the information contained in prices is less reliable, since firms can more easily 
disguise real price increases with nominal increases. This reduces competition among firms and increases the 
markup (Neiss, 2001). 
15 We used sales information from the firm database Osiris produced by Bureau van Dijk, which contains 
balance sheet information of over 22,000 firms in 90 countries. 
16 Most commonly used measures of financial development involve the ratio of some monetary variable to 
GDP (M2 or Credit), but we resorted to this indicator. 
17 Argentina and Colombia, have experienced an increase in their Debt to GDP ratios,   
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Institutional Variables 
 
Exchange rate regimes. Fixed exchange rate regimes have been widely used in the region 
to anchor inflation. Reinhart and Roggoff (2004) classify de facto exchange rate regimes 
and include dual or multiple rates regimes and parallel markets. They find that countries 
with multiple exchange rates and market-determined parallel rates exhibit higher inflation 
rates than countries with unified rates and less flexible regimes. The regime indicator 
associates lower values to fixed regimes and higher values to more flexible regimes, where 
dual/parallel markets are conceived as flexible regimes. We should then expect a negative 
correlation between this indicator and inflation. By examining the data in table 3 and Figure 
3, we notice that during the eighties dual/parallel markets and floating regimes were 
common throughout the region, whereas over the nineties there is a convergence to unified 
rates and less flexible regimes.  
 
Competition regulation. According to the arguments stated before, laws that promote 
competition should reduce market distortions and thereby diminish the inflation bias. We 
construct a de jure index that captures the following dimensions from the competition 
regulations across countries: i) forbidden practices, ii) types of sanctions, iii) the existence 
of a regulating entity and iv) controls over industrial concentration.  The index takes higher 
values the more the existing regulation promotes competition by sanctions or prohibition of 
monopolistic practices. Table A1 shows that only a few countries had competition 
regulations in the eighties, whereas in the nineties more countries created entities for 
surveillance and regulation of industrial practices. We explain the construction of this 
indicator in more detail in the Appendix.  As with every other de jure measure, we must 
keep in mind that the legal stance may not actually reflect the actual enforcement of the 
law. 
 
Central bank independence. The seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro 
and Gordon (1983) settled the theoretical grounds for the creation of independent central 
banks from political pressures to lessen the inflation bias. To empirically assess whether 
differences in central bank independence actually explain cross-country variations of 
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inflation rates, one needs an index to measure the degree of independence of central banks. 
In this paper we use the modified de jure Cukierman index constructed by Jácome and 
Vázquez (2005). The index takes higher values as the law contemplates more independence 
for the central bank from the executive in terms of the determination of inflation goals, the 
design and execution of monetary policy, guarantees political independence, limits direct 
funding of the executive, and compels more transparency.  Table 4 and Figure 4 suggest 
that all countries in the region did an effort to legally confer more independence to their 
central banks. We treat central bank independence as an endogenous variable, since legal 
reform may be a response to the large inflation rates experienced in previous years.  
 
Market oriented structural reforms. Starting in the mid-eighties there has been a 
continuous process of structural reform in Latin America, conceived to eliminate policy 
distortions that limit functioning of the markets or generate transaction costs for producers 
(see Table 5 and Figure 5). Reforms were designed to attain policy neutrality in order to 
obtain efficiency gains in resource allocation. Lora (2001) builds a structural policy index 
to measure the degree of progress in trade, financial, tax, and labor reforms and in 
privatization18. The index just quantifies the degree of neutrality of structural policies and 
does not measure distributive features or their quality in other aspects. The index takes 
values between 0 and 1, associating higher values to more neutral and market oriented 
policies. As these structural policies are designed to increase efficiency, reduce distortions 
and increase output, one should expect a negative correlation between the index and 
inflation. Structural reforms were not a random event: they responded to weak 
macroeconomic performance in the years previous to their implementation. Thus, we treat 
this variable as endogenous. 
 
                                                 
18 The index covers the following reforms (see Lora (2001) for more details):  
Trade policy: average tariffs and tariff dispersion 
Financial policy: reserve requirement, interest rate freedom, and quality of regulation of capital requirements 
Tax policy:  maximum marginal income tax rate on companies, maximum marginal income tax rate on 
persons, productivity of taxes on income, basic rate of the value-added tax, and productivity of the value-
added tax. 
Privatization: accumulated value of privatizations as a percentage of GDP 
Labor policy: ease of hiring (temporary contracts), ease of layoff (cost of layoff in terms of months of pay, 
flexibility of work day, and social security contributions as a percentage of wages. 
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Political constraints to changes in public policies. Instead of examining the role of 
political instability on inflation, which has been already examined in previous studies, we 
opted to investigate the effect of institutional limits to discretional changes in public 
policies. We should obviously expect fewer limits to discretionality to result in higher 
inflation rates.  
 
Henizs (2002) builds a measure of political constraints to estimate the feasibility of change 
in public policies, and captures how likely a change in preferences of any political actor 
translates into a change in the status quo public policy. To construct the index for countries 
in time, Henizs draws information from political science datasets. First, the author 
identifies the number of political agents in the system (executive branches, legislative 
chambers, judiciary and federal powers where applies) with veto power over changes in 
public policies. The more actors with veto power, the less likely a change in status quo 
policy will take place.  
 
The index also takes into account political alignment across government branches, since 
alignment among government branches reduces the probability that any agent will veto 
policy changes, thereby increasing the feasibility of policy change. Finally, the measure is 
adjusted to incorporate the degree of heterogeneity of the preferences and fractionalization 
of the legislature and court. Fractionalization increases (decreases) decision costs to veto 
policy changes in aligned branches (opposed) with the executive19. The index takes values 
between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates fewer political constraints to changes in public policies 
and thus more scope for discretionality20. Looking at Figure 6 we notice a tendency in the 
region towards increasing political limits to policy change. Yet in Table 6 we observe that 
this tendency varies a lot across countries. Since macroeconomic results may affect the 
political status, we also treated this variable as endogenous. 
 
                                                 
19 See Henizs (2002) for further details.  
20 The index we use here is a recent update by the author of the previously published one in Henizs (2002). 
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Government Institutions. The quality of government institutions in terms of the stance of 
the rule of law, democratic accountability, corruption and bureaucracy quality may well 
have an impact on resulting public policies. Better government institutions should lead to 
more stable and sound public policies and that should translate into lower inflation rates. 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) political risk rating index is constructed to 
assess political stability in the set of countries analyzed21. We use components of the ICRG 
political risk index to build a measure of government institutions. Higher values of the 
index can be associated with better institutions, so we may expect a negative correlation 
between the index and inflation. Table 7 and Figure 7 suggest that there has been an 
improvement in terms of the stability that sensible institutions may provide; yet again there 
is a large dispersion across countries. We treat this variable as endogenous. 
 
 
3. Econometric Specification and Results 
 
We use the following panel specification to assess the impact on inflation of our set of 
variables: 
 
iitiitittiit TtNiWXYY ,...,1,....,1''1, ==++++= − ενδβα                 (1) 
 
Where π
π
+= 1Y  and π is the percentage variation of CPI, X is a vector of  
strictly exogenous regressors, W is a vector of endogenous regressors, iν  are  
country effects, ε is the error term, i stands for the ith country and t for the each  
period. OLS estimation of equation (1) leads to biased and inconsistent estimators since  
the lagged values of the dependent variables are correlated with the individual effects. 
                                                 
21 The index includes the following components:  government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment 
profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. The index is computed on the basis of 
political information that is converted into points for each component. The political risk assessment is based 
on subjective analysis of available information.   
 14
Different operators, such as first differences and orthogonal deviations, can be used to  
eliminate the country effects in (1)22, leading to 
 
ititittiit WXYY εδβα Γ+Γ+Γ+Γ=Γ − ''1,        (2) 
 
Where is the operator to eliminate individual effects. We use orthogonal deviations to 
eliminate country effects. Equation (2) is suitable to efficient GMM estimation using the 
method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), exploiting a different set of instruments 
each period. We use the following instruments: Lags of the levels of the dependent variable 
(from the 2nd lag up to the 5th lag); levels of the variables lagged 2 periods or more for 
endogenous regressors; and untransformed orthogonal deviations for strictly exogenous 
variables. We use the 2-step GMM estimator (White period instrument weighting matrix) to 
control for heteroskedasticity. We worked with an unbalanced panel, since the periodic 
availability of the variables is not homogeneous over countries. Our approach in each case 
is to depart from a full set of variables and work towards a parsimonious model, 
progressively including and excluding variables to check for robustness. Tables 8 to 10 
display our main findings. In all cases the Sargan tests suggested the validity of the 
instruments. 
Γ
 
In Table 8 we begin by examining the relation between inflation and institutional 
arrangements including political limits to discretionality, structural reforms, exchange rate 
regimes, government institutions, competition regulation and central bank independence. 
The exchange rate regime turned out to be a very significant and robust variable, suggesting 
that unique and less flexible exchange rate regimes helped to reduce inflation rates over the 
nineties in Latin America, as may be expected. Using the extended or reduced classification 
in Reinhart and Roggoff (2004) did not alter the results. Consistent with the findings in 
Jácome and Vázquez (2005), once we include the measure of structural reforms and control 
for endogeneity, central bank independence fails to be significant. We also employed the 
                                                 
22 Arellano and Bond (1991) use first differences and Arellano and Bover (1995) propose orthogonal 
deviations. In the latter case, each observation is the deviation from the average of future observations in the 
sample, weighted to standardize the variance. Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest that the filtering method is 
irrelevant. 
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Cukierman index and a modification of the Jácome and Vázquez index23, but the results 
remain unchanged.  
 
Structural reforms are then negative and significantly correlated with inflation. 
Unfortunately, the index of the stance of structural reforms is only available for the period 
1985-1999 which prevented us from including more recent observations. We further tested 
the different components of the Lora index for structural reforms, but none of the 
components by itself explained more inflation than the total index24. Structural reform 
seemed them to have aided the reduction of inflation rates in the region over the past few 
years, while the evidence does not suggest an important role for central bank independence. 
We must keep in mind though that we work with a de jure measure that does not 
necessarily reflect actual central bank independence which is a caveat for this type of 
analysis.  
 
Political constraints to changes in public policies was also significant and with the expected 
sign, thus suggesting that the lower the feasibility of change in public policies, the lower 
the resulting inflation rates25. We think this is an interesting and sensible result, for it can be 
conceived as a test of the effect of the scope for policy discretionality on inflation. As 
political constraints on discretionality increased in the region over time, this may have 
reduced the dynamic inconsistency problem and thus helped to diminish the inflation bias. 
The quality of government institutions was also significant although the coefficient was not 
very robust, possibly due to the high correlation between this variable and the political 
constraints index26. Competition regulation was not significant in any case. So far, these 
                                                 
23 We modified the Jácome and Vázquez index by assigning different weights to the components, according to 
the frequencies observed in the sample of countries. This was achieved by the method of multiple 
correspondences. This method is similar to that of principal components, but it applies the distance instead 
of the Euclidean distance. The three measures of central bank independence – Cukierman, Jácome and 
Vázquez and our modified version of the Jácome and Vázquez – were highly correlated.  
2χ
24 Of these components, trade reforms, tax reforms and financial reforms were the most significant, while 
labor reform was weakly significant, and privatization was not significant at all. We do not present these 
results here, but they are available upon request to the author.  
25 Henizs (2002) computes two versions of the index: one that includes only the executive and legislative 
branches of government (pol3), and an extended one that includes the court and federal branches (pol5). We 
used the extended version of the index, although either one leads to the same results. 
26 See Table 15.   
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results highlight the important role that institutional arrangements have played in Latin 
America in the process of controlling inflation.   
 
Table 9 presents the results of different models where we examine the impact of several 
variables that reflect the underlying structure of the economy. The variables include per 
capita GDP growth, informal employment, size of the service sector, openness to trade 
market capitalization, income distribution and the degree of monopolistic competition 
(markup). The evidence suggests that growth, the size of the service sector and openness to 
trade are the most significant and robust of this set of variables. Countries that have grown 
faster have had less inflation. Openness to trade is positively correlated with inflation, 
suggesting that more open economies are more exposed to external shocks which directly 
affect inflation. This result holds even when we control for international inflation in the 
nineties (not shown)27. As international inflation observed a reduction in the nineties, more 
open economies probably benefited from lower inflation in imported goods to a larger 
extent.  
 
To measure the effect of the industrial structure on GDP on inflation, we tested the 
fractions of the different economic sectors to GDP, and the size of the service sector 
resulted to be the most robust of these shares. There is a negative correlation between the 
size of the service sector and inflation, which may be consistent with optimal taxation 
argument. But the contrary occurs with informal employment, which seems to be 
negatively correlated with inflation. According to Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) and 
Koreshkova (2003) this is the opposite of what we should expect. Informal employment 
though, may not be the best proxi for the contribution to GDP of the informal sector, which 
is what theory links to inflation.  
  
The degree of distortion created by monopolistic competition, captured through the 
markup, does not seem to play a role on inflation in Latin America, while a similar measure 
is positively and significantly correlated with inflation in OECD countries (see Neiss, 
                                                 
27 We use percentage variations of US CPI as a proxy for international inflation by. As we take the sample 
further back into the eighties, international inflation stops being significant. 
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2001). The markup is positively correlated with inflation, but its significance is disappears 
when we control for other variables. Since our measure of markup may pose some 
problems because it is based on national accounts averages, we also tried to an alternative 
measure of the degree of monopolistic competition that tries to capture the economy-wide 
industrial concentration (see Dutz and Hayri, 1999). Unfortunately, firm level data was 
only available after 1996 and for a limited number of countries and the same happens with 
bank-level data, available since 1999. This reduces considerably in some cases the number 
of observations does not allow to jointly consider these variables with the rest. Nonetheless, 
we used alternative measures of concentration, economy-wide and for the banking sector. 
Even though the sample size is a caveat, these results do not suggest either that more 
concentration is related to more inflation in Latin America. Yet again, in the case of 
economy-wide measures, a concentration measure drawn from listed firms may not be very 
representative in countries with very underdeveloped capital markets, which is also a caveat 
for our results.   
 
Other variables, the development of financial markets (market capitalization) and income 
distribution were not significant either. The degree of indebtedness is also positively 
correlated with inflation, but the significance of the coefficient is not very robust. Notice 
anyhow, that the sample of countries changes when we include the markup and informality, 
since that information is not available for all countries. Nevertheless, that does not seem to 
affect the significance of openness, size of the service sector or of growth.  
 
In Table 10 we present the results of models that combine institutional and structural 
variables that were significant in previous exercises28. Looking at the results from the 
different models, one may suspect the presence of some colinearity problems, probably 
stemming from the correlation between informality, government institutions, size of the 
service sector and structural reforms29. This problem is a caveat for the robustness of our 
analysis at this stage, although we tested several models and present those which appear to 
                                                 
28 Actually, we also tested for variables that were not significant in the previous exercise, such as the markup 
and the degree of indebtedness, etc., but for presentation purposes we opted to just include models with 
variables that were significant in Table 1 and Table 2.  
29 See Table 15.  
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be less sensitive to changes in specification. This process led us to exclude informality 
(Model 3 and Model 4), which proved the least robust of the variables. This may have to do 
with the reduction in the sample this variable imposes. Although the problem seems to 
diminish, the robustness of political constraints to discretionality and government 
institutions may still remain affected by their own correlation; although each variable is 
robust we tested separately with the rest of the variables. 
 
These exercises suggest that institutional arrangements are important determinants of 
inflation in Latin America, but so are some structural economic variables, such as the 
degree of openness and growth, which is consistent with findings in Aisen and Veiga 
(2000). The results are also in tune with those in Edwards and Tabellini (1991) in the sense 
that evidence to support optimal taxation motivations for inflation in developing countries 
is rather weak. Instead, variables that may affect the dynamic inconsistency problem for 
policy makers – other than central bank independence – seem to have a more important 
role, which is consistent also with findings in Capillo and Mirón (1997).  
 
Additionally, based on the previous results we conducted a cluster analysis for the purpose 
of visualizing where do countries stand in terms of inflation and the variables that proved to 
be its most significant and robust determinants (exchange rate regime, political limits to 
discretionality, government institutions, growth, structural reform and openness to trade). 
Cluster analysis allows sorting countries into homogenous groups according to similarities 
between the selected variables in the sample. 
 
The method departs from a Principal Components Analysis of the data matrix, finding 
linear combinations of the variables – e.i., principal components – to represent the data in 
space of a smaller dimension. Next, the most significant components are selected (those 
with eigenvalues > 1) and countries are sorted by means of the hierarchic pattern 
classification algorithm (Peña, 2001).  
 
The Principal Components Analysis results are summarized in Table 11, which presents the 
eigenvalues to each principal component and their correlation with each variable. When 
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selecting eigenvalues greater than one, we notice that the first, second and third factors 
explain 33%, 24% and 20% of the total variance respectively. Therefore, a representation of 
these three components in a three dimensional factorial space is able to explain 76.41% of 
the total information embedded in the variables. This proves very convenient to 
simultaneously classify the six variables and the seventeen countries in order to interpret 
the results.  
 
Examining the correlation of each variable with the first and second principal components, 
we observe that the first component is highly correlated with the political constraints to 
discretionality, the quality of government institutions and economic growth, which is why 
this component separates the countries with low and high values of these variables. 
Moreover, the second principal component is highly correlated with the exchange rate 
regime and structural reform indicators, so this combination allows ranking the countries in 
the sample according to their degree of flexibility in the exchange regime and of advances 
in structural reforms.  
 
Figure 8 presents the results of the hierarchic algorithm in the dendogram, which suggests 
that there are four significant groups to classify the countries into. Figure 9 displays these 
results in a biplot showing countries and directionality vectors for each variable30. The 
direction of the vector indicates higher values of each variable. In addition, we included 
inflation for illustration purposes, using the dimensional space defined by the principal 
components analysis. The following groups result:  
i) the group of countries with greater exchange rate flexibility and less advance in 
structural reforms (Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay) that in average 
showed the highest average inflation rates (32%),  
ii) the group of countries with worse government institutions and fewer political 
constraints to changes in public policies (Mexico, Colombia, Paraguay, 
Honduras, Peru and Guatemala) that in average reaches inflation rates of 16%,  
                                                 
30 Openness is not depicted in the biplot, since it is well represented only by the third principal component, 
and the biplot only considers the first and second principal components. Nevertheless, openness to trade was 
considered for the purposes of the hierarchic classification algorithm leading to the 4 group classification. 
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iii) the group of countries with more advances in structural reforms and less flexible 
exchange regimes (Nicaragua, Argentina, El Salvador and Bolivia), where 
average inflation rates reached 14%; and finally,  
iv) the group of countries with the better quality of government institutions, more 
political constraints to changes in public policies, and better growth 
performance (Dominican Republic, Chile and Costa Rica), corresponding to the 
group with lower average inflation rates (11%). 
 
This exercise we think is very illustrative. First, the group with lowest average inflation 
(Group 4) can be typified by having a better performance in terms of economic growth, 
better government institutions and more constraints to discretionality.  In fact, the stance of 
these countries in terms of these variables is what separates them from the rest of the 
countries. Second, the group with higher average inflation rates (Group 1) is characterized 
by more flexible exchange rate regimes and few advances in terms of structural policies, 
while showing average values in terms of government institutions, political constraints and 
growth.  
 
4. Final Remarks 
 
In this paper we attempt to examine the extent to which variables related to the economic 
structure and institutional arrangements explain inflation dynamics in Latin America in 
recent decades. We perform a dynamic panel data analysis that allowed us to consider the 
temporal dimension of the data, and to control for endogeneity of certain variables. Results 
lead us to believe that institutional arrangements – other than central bank independence –  
have played an important role in terms of inflation outcomes in Latin America. Variables 
that may affect inflation via time consistency problems seem somewhat more relevant than 
those suggested by optimal tax considerations. In particular, the negative correlations 
between inflation, political constraints to changes in public policies and better government 
institutions in Latin America are quite suggestive. 
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We find that unique and less flexible exchange rate regimes, contributed to the reduction in 
inflation rates in Latin America over the past years.  A caveat to these results stems from 
the availability of the data, which restricts the sample to the end of the nineties. Consistent 
with our results, the stabilization process that took place during that decade was largely 
influenced by the adoption of unique and predetermined exchange rate regimes. 
Nevertheless, in recent years many countries have adopted floats and use an inflation target 
to anchor price expectations. Due to the sample limitations, this new regime is not covered 
in our study.  
 
Advances in structural policies, contributed also to the reduction on inflation rates. This 
may suggest that the mitigation of certain distortions in the economy contributed to 
diminish inflation. Faster growing countries exhibited lower inflation rates. Openness to 
trade seems to be positively correlated with inflation, suggesting that more open economies 
are more exposed to external shocks, allowing countries to benefit in terms of importing 
lower international inflation rates in recent years.  
 
The degree of informality seems to be negatively related to inflation, but result is not very 
robust. The degree of indebtedness is positively correlated with inflation, but the effect 
does not appear to be very robust either. The signs of openness and informality are actually 
contrary to what should be expected according to optimal taxation motives. The degree of 
monopolistic competition, income distribution, financial development, and competition 
regulation did not prove to be significant. Results are robust to a large extent, but we 
suspect that colinearity may be affecting the robustness of some coefficients.  
 
On the other hand, one can always find better proxies for many of the variables here – e.g., 
a de facto measure of central bank independence, a better indicator of the markup not based 
on national accounts data, a better proxy of the contribution of the informal sector to GDP, 
etc.  – but that remains for future studies.  
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Table 1 
Inflation rate (%) 
(Country averages over sub-samples) 
 
Country 1980-1989 Country 1990-2004
Nicaragua 1693.8% Nicaragua 959.0%
Bolivia 1383.2% Brazil 767.3%
Argentina 565.7% Peru 734.8%
Peru 481.3% Argentina 229.8%
Brazil 354.5% Uruguay 44.9%
Mexico 69.0% Venezuela 44.6%
Uruguay 57.6% Ecuador 44.2%
Ecuador 34.0% Colombia 21.0%
Costa Rica 27.1% Mexico 19.4%
Colombia 23.5% Honduras 18.9%
Venezuela 23.0% Costa Rica 16.3%
Chile 21.4% Paraguay 15.7%
Dominicana 20.9% Dominicana 14.6%
Paraguay 20.2% Guatemala 14.0%
El Salvador 18.5% Chile 11.0%
Guatemala 12.1% Bolivia 9.9%
Honduras 7.4% El Salvador 9.9%
Panamá 3.1% Panamá 1.1%
Average 267.6% Average 165.4%
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Table 2 
Per capita Gross Domestics Product Growth 
at constant market prices in dolars 
 (Country averages over sub-samples) 
 
Country 1980-1989 Country 1990-2002
Colombia 1.6% Chile 3.7%
Chile 1.3% Dominicana 2.8%
Dominicana 1.0% Panamá 2.1%
Brazil 0.2% El Salvador 2.0%
Paraguay 0.0% Costa Rica 1.9%
Honduras -0.5% Mexico 1.4%
Mexico -0.6% Peru 1.2%
Uruguay -0.7% Bolivia 1.2%
Costa Rica -0.8% Guatemala 1.1%
Ecuador -1.0% Colombia 0.6%
Panamá -1.4% Ecuador 0.5%
Guatemala -1.9% Argentina 0.5%
El Salvador -2.0% Brazil 0.4%
Argentina -2.2% Uruguay 0.3%
Bolivia -2.4% Nicaragua 0.1%
Peru -2.9% Honduras 0.0%
Venezuela -4.1% Venezuela -0.3%
Nicaragua -4.4% Paraguay -1.1%
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Table 3 
Exchange rate regimes  
Reinhart and Rogoff classification 
 (Country averages over sub-samples) 
 
Country 1980-1989 Country 1990-2001
Peru 5.0 Brazil 3.7
Brazil 5.0 Ecuador 3.6
Nicaragua 4.7 Uruguay 3.3
Argentina 4.3 Venezuela 3.3
Bolivia 4.2 Chile 3.0
Uruguay 4.1 Colombia 3.0
Mexico 4.0 Honduras 2.9
Dominicana 3.8 Peru 2.8
Ecuador 3.6 Mexico 2.7
Costa Rica 3.4 Dominicana 2.6
Paraguay 3.4 Paraguay 2.5
Venezuela 3.0 Guatemala 2.3
Chile 2.8 Nicaragua 2.1
El Salvador 2.7 Costa Rica 2.1
Guatemala 2.6 Bolivia 2.0
Colombia 2.6 Argentina 1.3
Honduras 2.0 El Salvador 1.0
Panamá 1.0 Panamá 1.0
Average 3.5 Average 2.5
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Table 4 
Central Bank Independence 
Modified Cukierman Index 
(Country averages over sub-samples) 
 
Country 1980-1989 Country 1990-2004
Nicaragua 0.59 Chile 0.85
Guatemala 0.57 Peru 0.79
Costa Rica 0.51 Argentina 0.76
Peru 0.50 Colombia 0.76
Chile 0.48 Mexico 0.72
Dominicana 0.44 El Salvador 0.72
Uruguay 0.44 Nicaragua 0.71
Venezuela 0.40 Venezuela 0.68
El Salvador 0.39 Costa Rica 0.66
Mexico 0.39 Bolivia 0.66
Honduras 0.39 Ecuador 0.60
Paraguay 0.37 Uruguay 0.59
Ecuador 0.36 Paraguay 0.59
Bolivia 0.33 Guatemala 0.57
Argentina 0.31 Honduras 0.56
Colombia 0.29 Brazil 0.50
Brazil 0.24 Dominicana 0.44
Panamá 0.18 Panamá 0.18
Average 0.40 Average 0.63
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Table 5 
Market oriented structural reform  
Lora’s index 
 (Country averages over sub-samples) 
 
Country 1980-1989 Country 1990-1999
Chile 0.53 Nicaragua 0.59
Guatemala 0.39 Argentina 0.58
Costa Rica 0.39 Bolivia 0.58
Bolivia 0.37 Chile 0.58
Colombia 0.37 Peru 0.55
Uruguay 0.36 Paraguay 0.54
Paraguay 0.36 Colombia 0.52
Honduras 0.35 Honduras 0.51
El Salvador 0.35 Brazil 0.51
Mexico 0.35 Guatemala 0.50
Argentina 0.33 Mexico 0.49
Brazil 0.33 Costa Rica 0.49
Ecuador 0.32 Ecuador 0.49
Peru 0.30 El Salvador 0.48
Venezuela 0.28 Venezuela 0.46
Dominicana NA Dominicana 0.45
Nicaragua NA Uruguay 0.44
Panamá NA Panamá NA
Average 0.36 Average 0.51
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Table 6 
Political constriants to discretionality  
in public policies 
 (Country averages over sub-samples) 
 
Country 1980-1989 Country 1990-2004
Costa Rica 0.38 Brazil 0.67
Ecuador 0.34 Uruguay 0.53
Venezuela 0.40 Chile 0.50
Brazil 0.24 Panamá 0.49
Colombia 0.42 Bolivia 0.48
Dominicana 0.42 Argentina 0.46
Peru 0.39 Paraguay 0.44
Bolivia 0.34 Peru 0.43
Guatemala 0.29 Dominicana 0.40
Honduras 0.28 Colombia 0.39
Uruguay 0.26 El Salvador 0.38
Nicaragua 0.25 Nicaragua 0.37
Argentina 0.23 Costa Rica 0.36
Mexico 0.19 Mexico 0.35
El Salvador 0.24 Honduras 0.34
Panamá 0.19 Venezuela 0.33
Paraguay 0.03 Guatemala 0.29
Chile 0.00 Ecuador 0.25
Average 0.27 Average 0.42
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Table 7 
Government Institutions Index 
(Country averages over sub-samples) 
 
Country 1980-1989 Country 1990-2004
Costa Rica 20.94 Costa Rica 23.62
Brazil 20.13 Chile 23.56
Venezuela 19.00 Mexico 20.96
Ecuador 17.53 Uruguay 20.51
Mexico 17.15 Argentina 20.21
Colombia 17.14 Dominicana 19.71
Argentina 16.75 Nicaragua 18.64
Chile 16.65 Brazil 18.39
Uruguay 16.50 Ecuador 18.16
Dominicana 15.63 Bolivia 18.07
Nicaragua 13.22 Panamá 17.84
Peru 12.19 Venezuela 17.72
Honduras 11.19 Guatemala 17.06
Panamá 10.46 El Salvador 16.85
Paraguay 9.78 Peru 16.72
Guatemala 9.54 Paraguay 16.66
Bolivia 8.64 Colombia 16.32
El Salvador 8.57 Honduras 16.32
Average 14.50 Average 18.74
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Government Institutions Index 
 (Latin America Average: 1984-2004) 
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Table 11 
Principal Component Analysis 
Countries:  17 Latin-Americans countries 
Sample: 1989-1999 
Correlation: Variables - Components
Inflation FX Regime
Limits 
Discrecionality
Gvt. 
Institution Growth Reforms Openness
First 1.9685 32.81 -0.13 -0.10 -0.84 -0.94 -0.60 0.06 -0.08
Second 1.4147 23.58 0.64 0.88 0.19 -0.05 -0.41 -0.65 0.00
Third 1.2013 20.02 -0.56 -0.20 -0.30 -0.03 0.34 -0.57 0.80
Fourth 0.8011 13.35 0.01 -0.01 0.27 0.06 -0.50 0.38 0.58
Fifth 0.4262 7.1 0.17 -0.41 0.14 0.11 -0.31 -0.33 -0.14
Variance 
(%)Eigenvalue
Principal 
components
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Hierarchic classification dendogram  
Sample: 17 Latin American countries 
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 Appendix 
Competition Regulation Index 
 
The Competition Regulation Index is a measure of the degree of competition promotion through 
laws and procedures. The index covers the 18 countries of the sample between years 1980 and 
2004. This indicator was elaborated considering the following four dimensions: i) forbidden 
practices, ii) types of sanctions, iii) existence of a regulating entity, and iv) controls over industrial 
concentration. Each category has values ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates presence of the 
dimension. The non-weighed sum of these components is the competition regulation index that 
ranges between zero and four. Values near four indicate higher levels of promotion of competition, 
and values near zero suggest absence of competition regulation, which may allow for non-
competitive practices. 
 
Table A1 
Competition regulation index 
(Latin America countries) 
 
Country 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2005
Argentina 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.9
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.4 2.4
Brazil 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Chile 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Colombia 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Costa Rica 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.3 3.3
Dominicana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
El Salvador 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Guatemala 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Honduras 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Nicaragua 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Panamá 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 3.4
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Peru 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.6 2.6
Uruguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
Venezuela 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.2 3.2
Average 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.8
Country laws 6 6 12 14 15  
 Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The dimensions of the index can be described as follows:  
 
 37
i) Forbidden practices: this dimension covers the extent to which legislators try to 
eliminate market distortions that hinder competition by means of the prohibition of 
certain practices. The prohibitions we consider are drawn from the listing prepared by 
the Tripartite Committee of the Organization of American States (2002), which include: 
price fixing and other sales conditioning, barriers of entrance, collusion tenders, 
production or sale cuts through the fixation or the distribution of quotas, agreements on 
refusals of products acquisition, the distribution of market, discriminatory and 
predatory agreements, subordinated contracts, exclusive agreements, abuses of 
dominion position or monopoly, and boycotts.  
ii) Types of sanctions: an element that allows assessing the scope of the competition laws 
is the establishment of legal sanctions to non-observance. In this sense, the existence of 
sanctions of administrative or penal nature is reviewed in each law,  
iii) Enforcement entities: Generally, the competition laws are better enforced by 
independent bodies or agencies in the form of a commission or superintendence. This 
body is in charge of surveillance and regulation of cases of forbidden practices, and in 
some cases solves and sanctions anti-competitive practices, ensuring law 
implementation.  
iv) Industrial concentration: this last element considers the existence of legal dispositi
 ons that prohibit or limit the fusion, merging, acquisition or establishment of 
companies in the market, considering that these practices can disrupt competition. 
 
Table A1 shows that during the eighties, only six countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico), had a competition legal framework. Along with the process of 
structural reforms during the nineties, the incorporation of competition regulation spread throughout 
the region. By 2000 fifteen had already established competition laws.  
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